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1. Introduction 
A  significant  amount  of  work  in  the  recent  literature  on  subjective  wellbeing  has 
focused  on  the  role  of  relative  wages  in  determining  job  satisfaction:  the  idea  is  that  job 
satisfaction is not determined only by absolute wages, but rather by relative wages (see for 
example, Capelli and Sherer, 1988; Dornstein, 1988; Loscocco and Spitze, 1991; Moore, 1991, 
Pfeffer and Langton, 1993; Clark  and Oswald, 1996; Law and Wong, 1998; Stutzer, 2004; 
Bygren, 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Brown et al., 2007; Clark et al., 2007; Clark et al., 
2009). This literature has generally concluded that relative wages are important in determining 
workers’  job  or  pay  satisfaction.  And,  between-firm,  within-establishment  and  within-
occupational references are those used by employees when they evaluate their pay. 
  In empirical research on worker well-being and wage distribution at establishment level, 
the findings are rather unsatisfactory. The mechanisms underlying the importance of relative 
wages (i.e. envy, pride, compassion, etc.) are indeed not sufficiently empirically investigated. 
Moreover,  no  conclusions  about  the  impact  of  within  establishment  wage  inequality  on 
satisfaction are achieved. But, these issues are important for how firms functions, as well as for 
the labor market as a whole. In facts, worker pay satisfaction has been shown to be associated 
with  job  performance,  worker  turnover,  absenteeism  and  endorsement  of  collective  action 
strategies (i.e. Harder, 1992; Levine, 1993; Leicht and Shapelak, 1994; Curtin, 1977; Weiner, 
1980; Patterson et al., 2004).  
The aims  of this paper are twofold: firstly, to study the  mechanisms underlying the 
importance of relative wages in determining worker satisfaction; secondly, to assess whether 
high within establishment wage inequality leads, on average, to high satisfaction. To achieve 
our aims, we model individual utility from pay as a function of worker’s own wage and the 
earnings of all other workers within the same establishment, and we estimate the model using 
UK data. 
 
2. The model 
Models of relative concerns assume that individual utility from pay depends not only on 
individual own wage but also on the wage of others (for a review see Hopkins, 2008).  The 
effect of one’s own wage on utility from pay is assumed to be positive. Increases in the wages 
of someone  richer  may  have  ambiguous  effects. If  satisfaction  decreases,  we  observe  envy 
(Friedman and Ostrov, 2005). If satisfaction rises, we face the tunnel effect (Hirschman and 
Rothschild, 1973): others good fortune provides information about my own future prospects. 
Changes in the wages of someone poorer may have also ambiguous effects. Improvements in 
those below you may decrease satisfaction. Friedman (2005) call this pride. Or, improvements 
for others may impact positively on satisfaction whether some compassion feelings exist.    3
The above observations may be formalized using an adapted model of Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999), where the utility from pay, U*, of an individual i in establishment k with wage wik 
depends on comparisons with n other people working in the same establishment with wages w-ik 
(with w1k<w2k< … <wi-1 k<wi+1 k<…<wnk) 
 
(1)  Uik* = U*(wik, w-ik) = wik + (α/n-1) ∑wjk>wik (wjk – wik) +(β/n-1) ∑wjk<wik (wik – wjk) 
 
where α is a weight on the average of wages that are above the individual’s wage and β  is a 
weight on the average of wages below the individual’s one. If α<0, we have so called envy, a 
dislike of others having more. If α>0, we observe the tunnel effect. If β is negative, we have 
compassion.  If  β  is  positive  we  have  pride  as  then  lower  wages  for  others  increase  an 
individual’s satisfaction.  
In a large population with wage distribution F(.), Eq. 1 can be written as: 
 
(2)    Uik* = U*(wik, w-ik) = wik +β (wik – µwk) + (α+ β) R(wik) 
 
where µwk is the average wage in establishment k and R(wik)=∫zik (1-F(y))dy is the measure of 
relative deprivation introduced by Yitzahaki (1979). See Deaton (2003) for details. Looking at 
Eq.  2,  we  can  immediately  notice  a  link  existing  between  utility  from  pay  and  wage 
equality/inequality.  As  point  out  in  Hopkins  (2008),  it  can  be  shown  that  if  there  are  two 
distributions F(w) and G(w) that have the same mean and the same support and if F is more 
equal  in  the  sense  of  second  order  stochastic  dominance  (equivalently  generalized  Lorenz 
dominance) then R(w) is lower at all wage levels under F than under G. Actually, if the means 
are the same, generalized Lorenz dominance is the same than Lorenz dominance; if F Lorenz 
dominates G than the Lorenz curve associated with F is always closer to the line of complete 
equality  than  of  G,  implying  a  lower  Gini  coefficient  (see  Thistle,  1989,  Shaked  and 
Shanthikumar, 2007). Thus, in Eq. 2, if (α+β)<0, then an individual will have higher utility in 
more equal establishment (even keeping her own wage constant). If (α+β)>0, then great intra-
establishment wage inequality leads, on average, to high utility. The signs and the sizes of the 
parameters α and β are empirical questions and they are the focus of this paper.  
Our aim is, therefore, to empirically estimate the parameter α and β in Eq. 1. For simplicity, 
we assume α<0 (envy) and β>0 (pride) and we empirically test our assumptions. To do so, we 
estimate a random effects ordered probit model. Utility from pay of worker i in establishment j 
is unobservable, what we observe is only the response to a question on satisfaction with pay, U 
(that is a categorical ordered response variable). We assume U*jk be a linear function of the 
worker and job characteristics, Xik, i.e. the latter vector includes the worker’s wage, wik, a proxy   4
for envy, eik=(∑wjk>wik (wjk – wik))/(n-1), and a proxy for pride, pik=(∑wjk<wik (wik – wjk))/(n-1). 
The model can be written as 
 
(3)        Uik*=Xik γ +µk+εik 
Uik=j ↔τj-1<Uik*≤τj     with j=0..J 
 
where ε is the i.i.d. error term, µk represents the random establishment effects, J is the 
number of response categories and τj are threshold levels.
1 Note that the random effects 
estimator (RE) assumes orthogonality between the effects and all covariates: if this assumption 
fails, then RE is not consistent. In the latter case, we can follow two possible approaches. First, 
we  can  use  the  Mundlak  correction  term  (as  in  Clark  et  al.,  2009):  we  decompose  the 
establishment effect, µk, into a random effect, µ0k, that is uncorrelated with the covariates and a 
mean value of some of the establishment varying covariates (i.e. average establishment wage) 
that are allowed to be correlated with the random effects. Second, we can follow the approach 
proposed  by  Ferrer-i-Cardonell  and  Frijters  (2004)  that  considers  satisfaction  as  a  cardinal 
variable and applies linear techniques, producing within regression. As robustness check, we 
perform both approaches.  
 
3. Data and estimation results 
Data are taken from the 2004 Employee Relation Survey (WERS), a survey aims to 
provide a nationally representative account of the state of employment relations and working 
life inside British workplaces/establishments. The survey includes: management questionnaires 
about  the  composition  of  the  workforce;  employee  questionnaires  (distributed  to  a  random 
selection of up to 25 employees within each organization); financial manager questionnaires 
about  the  financial  performance  of  the  establishment;  and,  union  and  non-union  employee 
representative questionnaires. From this dataset we have taken a sub-sample of employee aged 
22+, working in establishments with 25 or more employees. After elimination of observations 
with  missing  values  on  essential  variables,  9822  employee  observations,  clustered  in  1073 
establishments,  are  used  in  the  empirical  analysis.  The  average  number  of  employees  for 
establishment is about 446. The average number of observations for establishment is about 17. 
Employee weights are used as appropriate. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics. 
Our dependent variable is “satisfaction with the amount of pay” that is measured on a 
scale  from  1,  “very  dissatisfied”  to  5,  “very  satisfied”.  The  frequency  distribution  of  the 
response to job satisfaction question shows that 34% of the workers in our sample are at least 
                                                
1 Unfortunately, we have cross-sectional data (and not panel data); therefore, individual effects are not 
included in the model.   5
“satisfied” (only about 4% are “very satisfied”), while nearly 42% are “dissatisfied” or “very 
dissatisfied” (about 13.5% are “very dissatisfied”). 
Employees are asked about how much they are paid for week (before tax and other 
deductions were taken out). They respond by ticking one of 14 boxes corresponding to bands of 
weekly  gross  pay.  Figure 1  shows the  pay  distribution.  Using  this  information,  the  worker 
weekly  wage  is  defined  as  the  mean  value  of  the  band  to  which  she  belongs.  Moreover, 
managers are asked about the wage distribution at establishment level (that is, the number of 
employees  in  each  of  the  four  bands  of  weekly  gross  pay  defined  in  the  management 
questionnaire).
2 See Figure 2. This information permits us to define the variables “envy” and 
“pride”. By construction, individuals do not feel envy or pride for others in the some band, but 
they exhibit envy or pride (as appropriate) for workers belonging to different bands of wages. 
Note that using wage classes permits to reduce noises due to small variations of wages across 
workers.  On  the  other  side,  it  could  underestimate  the  importance  of  envy  and  pride  in 
determining satisfaction.   
pecifications are estimated: (i) the random effects ordered probit model; (ii) the random effects 
ordered probit model with the Mundlak correction; (iii) the linear fixed effect model.  
We find similar results across all specifications. The estimated coefficient on own wage is 
positive and significant indicating a positive relationship between own wage and satisfaction 
(conditional to the other  covariates). This relationship is expected and  consistent  with  most 
results  in  the  literature.  Of  most  interest,  we  focus  on  the  impact  of  worker’s  feelings  on 
satisfaction. We find that:  
(i)  the  estimated  coefficient  on  envy  is  negative  and  significant  (α<0),  i.e.  higher 
wages for others decrease individual’s satisfaction;  
(ii)  the estimated coefficient on pride is positive and significant (β>0), i.e. lower wages 
for others increase individual’s satisfaction;  
(iii)  the estimated coefficient on envy is smaller than the one on pride (α+β>0), i.e. great 
within-establishment wage inequality leads, on average, to high satisfaction;  
(iv)  there is no direct evidence of compassion and tunnel effect.  
Finally,  focusing  on  the  second  specification,  the  estimated  coefficient  on  the  average 
establishment wage (Mundlak term) is positive and significant suggesting that workers are 
more satisfied in establishments able to pay in average better wages. In facts, high average 
wages can be seen as signal about the worker’s own future wage. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Clark et al. (2009). 
 
4. Conclusion 
                                                
2 Bands of weekly gross pay: £180 or less; £181-£200; £201-£599; £600 or more    6
In this paper, we model individual utility from pay as function of worker’s own wage and the 
earnings of all other workers within the same establishment. We conclude that feelings as envy 
and pride matter in determining utility from pay. In particular, we find that the impact of envy is 
smaller than the one of pride. This leads to the conclusion that great within-establishment wage 
inequality implies, on average, high satisfaction. Our results are particularly relevant for the 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  %  Variable  % 
female  45.49  Establishment size: 25-49  18.36 
age 22-29  16.88  Establishment size: 50-99  18.66 
age 30-39  27.39  Establishment size: 100-199  17.24 
age 40-49  28.3  Establishment size: 200-599  24.57 
age_50-59  23.1  Establishment size: >599  21.17 
age 60-64  4.33  North east  4.13 
long_tenure (tenure longer than 3 years)  48.22  North west  14.35 
I feel my job secure  (yes/no)  63.71  yorkshire & the humber   9.89 
Supervision activity (yes/no)  36.15  east midlands   6.62 
autonomy at work (yes/no)  35.94  West midlands  8.21 
Stress at work (yes/no)  20.18  east of England  8.81 
Flexi-time available (yes/no)  45.94  London   11.41 
Good relation with managers (yes/no)  56.16  South east  13.12 
Training (yes/no)  41.17  South west  8.11 
Living in couple  70.87  Scotland   11.95 
children   58.52  Wales   3.4 
No british  11.92  low education  33.18 
Union member  37.42  medium education  37.54 
    high education  29.28 
   mean     mean 
hour worked per week   37.65  satisfaction with pay   2.82 
   9
Table 2. Estimates (extended version) 
 
   Random effects  Random effects  Random effects  Fixed effects    
The dependent variable is:  Ordered probit     Ordered probit    Linear Regression  Linear Regression 
Satisfaction with pay  Coef.     SE  Coef.     SE  Coef.     SE  Coef.     SE 
Ln (own wages)  0.002  **  0.000  0.002  **  0.000  0.002  **  0.000  0.001  **  0.000 
Ln (pride)   0.252  **  0.081  0.407  **  0.089  0.215  **  0.073  0.361  **  0.091 
Ln (envy)   -0.148  *  0.065  -0.192  **  0.066  -0.133  *  0.059  -0.174  **  0.067 
Ln (average establishment wage) = 
the Mundlak term)  No    no  0.383  **  0.091  no    no  no    no 
Female  0.215  **  0.027  0.210  **  0.027  0.188  **  0.025  0.201  **  0.026 
age 30-39  0.084  *  0.037  0.083  *  0.037  0.079  *  0.034  0.085  *  0.035 
age 40-49  0.029    0.039  0.026    0.039  0.028    0.035  0.044    0.037 
age_50-59  -0.040    0.041  -0.043    0.041  -0.032    0.037  -0.015    0.039 
age 60-64  0.265  **  0.069  0.261  **  0.069  0.234  **  0.063  0.248  **  0.066 
medium education  -0.104  **  0.029  -0.113  **  0.030  -0.093  **  0.027  -0.095  **  0.028 
high education  -0.216  **  0.036  -0.235  **  0.036  -0.192  **  0.032  -0.197  **  0.035 
living in couple  0.046    0.026  0.042    0.026  0.050  *  0.024  0.047    0.025 
children   0.083  **  0.026  0.082  **  0.026  0.073  **  0.024  0.076  **  0.025 
No British  -0.070    0.040  -0.062  *  0.041  -0.066    0.037  -0.067    0.040 
hour worked per week  -0.016  **  0.001  -0.015  **  0.001  -0.015  **  0.001  -0.014  **  0.001 
long_tenure (tenure longer than 3 
years)  -0.066  **  0.025  -0.065  **  0.025  -0.064  **  0.023  -0.066  **  0.024 
I feel my job secure  (yes/no)  0.264    0.025  0.265  **  0.025  0.238  **  0.023  0.237  **  0.024 
Supervision activity (yes/no)  -0.052  **  0.027  -0.044    0.027  -0.048    0.024  -0.027    0.026 
autonomy at work (yes/no)  0.136  **  0.025  0.139  **  0.025  0.116  **  0.023  0.111  **  0.024 
Stress at work (yes/no)  -0.248  **  0.029  -0.246  **  0.029  -0.224  **  0.026  -0.207  **  0.027 
Flexi-time available (yes/no)  0.136  **  0.025  0.138  **  0.025  0.123  **  0.022  0.159  **  0.025 
Good relation with managers (yes/no)  0.446  **  0.025  0.442  **  0.025  0.408  **  0.023  0.381  **  0.024 
Training (yes/no)  0.111  **  0.025  0.111  **  0.024  0.105  **  0.022  0.117  **  0.024 
Sector dummies  Yes    yes  Yes    yes  yes    yes        
Establishment size: 50-99  -0.059    0.046  -0.064    0.045  -0.057    0.041        
Establishment size: 100-199  0.020    0.046  0.006    0.046  0.013    0.042        
Establishment size: 200-599  -0.053    0.045  -0.064    0.045  -0.049    0.041        
Establishment size: >599  -0.142  **  0.048  -0.159  **  0.048  -0.133  **  0.044        
north west  -0.050    0.080  -0.043    0.079  -0.049    0.073        
yorkshire & the humber  -0.073    0.083  -0.063    0.083  -0.060    0.076        
east midlands  0.013    0.090  0.014    0.089  0.006    0.082        
west midlands  -0.034    0.085  -0.036    0.084  -0.036    0.077        
east of England  -0.118    0.085  -0.124    0.084  -0.106    0.077        
London  -0.214  *  0.084  -0.252  **  0.084  -0.190  *  0.076        
south east   -0.109    0.081  -0.135    0.081  -0.095    0.074        
south west   -0.102    0.085  -0.100    0.084  -0.098    0.077        
Scotland  -0.029    0.081  -0.027    0.081  -0.029    0.074        
Wales  0.062    0.097  0.060    0.096  0.046    0.088        
Union member (yes/no)  -0.047    0.026  -0.048    0.026  -0.048  *  0.024  -0.051    0.028 
Constant                2.509  **  0.118  2.212  **  0.068 
No. Obs  9822       9822      9822       9822      
No. Establishments  1073       1073      1073       1073      
Estimated cut-points(4)  Yes        Yes        no        no         10
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